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Abstract
Here we propose a general theoretical method for analyzing the risk bound in the
presence of adversaries. Specifically, we try to fit the adversarial learning problem
into the minimax framework. We first show that the original adversarial learning
problem can be reduced to a minimax statistical learning problem by introducing
a transport map between distributions. Then, we prove a new risk bound for this
minimax problem in terms of covering numbers under a weak version of Lipschitz
condition. Our method can be applied to multi-class classification problems and com-
monly used loss functions such as the hinge and ramp losses. As some illustrative
examples, we derive the adversarial risk bounds for SVMs, deep neural networks, and
PCA, and our bounds have two data-dependent terms, which can be optimized for
achieving adversarial robustness.
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1 Introduction
Machine learning models, especially deep neural networks, have achieved impres-
sive performance across a variety of domains including image classification, natural
language processing, and speech recognition. However, these techniques can easily
be fooled by adversarial examples, i.e., carefully perturbed input samples aimed to
cause misclassification during the test phase. This phenomenon was first studied in
spam filtering [15, 32, 33] and has attracted considerable attention since 2014, when
Szegedy et al. [43] noticed that small perturbations in images can cause misclassifica-
tion in neural network classifiers. Since then, there has been considerable focus on
developing adversarial attacks against machine learning algorithms [22, 9, 8, 4, 45],
and, in response, many defensemechanismshave also been proposed to counter these
attacks [23, 21, 16, 42, 34]. These works focus on creating optimization-based robust
algorithms, but their generalization performance under adversarial input perturba-
tions is still not fully understood.
Schmidt et al. [39] recently discussed the generalization problem in the adversar-
ial setting and showed that the sample complexity of learning a specific distribution
in the presence of l∞-bounded adversaries increases by an order of
√
d for all classi-
fiers. The same paper recognized that deriving the agnostic-distribution generaliza-
tion bound remained an open problem [39]. In a subsequent study, Cullina et al. [14]
extended the standard PAC-learning framework to the adversarial setting by defin-
ing a corrupted hypothesis class and showed that the VC dimension of this corrupted
hypothesis class for halfspace classifiers does not increase in the presence of an ad-
versary. While their work provided a theoretical understanding of the problem of
learning with adversaries, it had two limitations. First, their results could only be ap-
plied to binary problems, whereas in practice we usually need to handle multi-class
problems. Second, the 0-1 loss function used in their work is not convex and thus
very hard to optimize.
In this paper, we propose a general theoretical method for analyzing generaliza-
tion performance in the presence of adversaries. In particular, we attempt to fit the
adversarial learning problem into the minimax framework [29]. In contrast to tradi-
tional statistical learning, where the underlying data distribution P is unknown but
fixed, the minimax framework considers the uncertainty about the distribution P by
introducing an ambiguity set and then aims to minimize the risk with respect to the
worst-case distribution in this set. Motivated by Lee and Raginsky [29], we first note
that the adversarial expected risk over a distribution P is equivalent to the standard
expected risk under a new distribution P ′. Since this new distribution is not fixed
and depends on the hypothesis, we instead consider the worst case. In this way, the
original adversarial learning problem is reduced to a minimax problem, and we use
the minimax approach to derive the risk bound for the adversarial expected risk. Our
contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We propose a general method for analyzing the risk bound in the presence of
adversaries. Our method is general in several respects. First, the adversary we
consider is general and encompasses all lp bounded adversaries for p ≥ 1. Sec-
ond, our method can be applied to multi-class problems and other commonly
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used loss functions such as the hinge loss and ramp loss, whereas Cullina et al.
[14] only considered the binary classification problem and the 0-1 loss.
• We prove a new bound for the local worst-case risk under a weak version of
Lipschitz condition. Our bound is always better than that of Lee and Raginsky
[30], and can recover the standard non-adversarial risk bound by setting the
radius ǫB of the adversary to 0, whereas Lee and Raginsky [30] give a ǫB-free
bound.
• We derive the adversarial risk bounds for SVM, deep neural networks, and PCA.
Our bounds have two data-dependent terms, suggesting that minimizing the
sum of the two terms can help achieve adversarial robustness.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss
relatedworks. Section 3 formally defines the problem, and we present our theoretical
method in Section 4. The adversarial risk bounds for SVM, neural networks, and PCA
are described in Section 5, and we conclude and discuss future directions in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Our work leverages some of the benefits of statistical machine learning, summarized
as follows.
2.1 Generalization in Supervised Learning
Generalization is a central problem in supervised learning, and the generalization
capability of learning algorithms has been extensively studied. Here we review the
salient aspects of generalization in supervised learning relevant to this work.
Two main approaches are used to analyze the generalization bound of a learning
algorithm. The first is based on the complexity of the hypothesis class, such as the VC
dimension [46, 47] for binary classification, Rademacher and Gaussian complexities
[7, 5], and the covering number [55, 54, 6]. Note that hypothesis complexity-based
analyses of generalization error are algorithm independent and consider the worst-
case generalization over all functions in the hypothesis class. In contrast, the second
approach is based on the properties of a learning algorithm and is therefore algorithm
dependent. The properties characterizing the generalization of a learning algorithm
include, for example, algorithmic stability [11, 40, 31], robustness [51], and algorith-
mic luckiness [25]. Some other methods exist for analyzing the generalization error
in machine learning such as the PAC-Bayesian approach [36, 2], compression-based
bounds [28, 3], and information-theoretic approaches [50, 1, 38, 53].
2.2 Minimax Statistical Learning
In contrast to standard empirical risk minimization in supervised learning, where
test data follow the same distribution as training data, minimax statistical learning
arises in problems of distributionally robust learning [17, 19, 29, 30, 41] and mini-
mizes the worst-case risk over a family of probability distributions. Thus, it can be
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applied to the learning setting in which the test data distribution differs from that of
the training data, such as in domain adaptation and transfer learning [12]. In particu-
lar, Gao and Kleywegt [19] proposed a dual representation of worst-case risk over the
ambiguity set of probability distributions, which was given by balls in Wasserstein
space. Then, Lee and Raginsky [29] derived the risk bound for minimax learning by
exploiting the dual representation of worst-case risk proposed by Gao and Kleywegt
[19]. However, the minimax risk bound proposed in Lee and Raginsky [29] would
go to infinity and thus become vacuous as ǫB → 0. During the preparation of the
initial draft of this paper, Lee and Raginsky [30] presented a new bound by impos-
ing a Lipschitz assumption to avoid this problem. However, their new bound was
ǫB-free and cannot recover the usual risk bound by setting ǫB = 0. Sinha et al. [41]
also provided a similar upper bound on the worst-case population loss over distribu-
tions defined by a certain distributional Wasserstein distance, and their bound was
efficiently computable by a principled adversarial training procedure and hence certi-
fied a level of robustness. However their training procedure required that the penalty
parameter should be large enough and thus can only achieve a small amount of ro-
bustness. Here we improve on the results in Lee and Raginsky [29, 30] and present a
new risk bound for the minimax problem.
2.3 Learning with Adversaries
The existence of adversaries during the test phase of a learning algorithm makes
learning systems untrustworthy. There is extensive literature on analysis of adver-
sarial robustness [48, 18, 24, 20] and design of provable defense against adversarial
attacks[49, 37, 34, 41], in contrast to the relatively limited literature on risk bound
analysis of adversarial learning. A comprehensive review of works on adversarial
machine learning can be found in Biggio and Roli [10]. Concurrently to our work,
Khim and Loh [26] and Yin et al. [52] provided different approaches for deriving ad-
versarial risk bounds. Khim and Loh [26] derived adversarial risk bounds for linear
classifiers and neural networks using a method called function transformation. How-
ever, their approach can only be applied to binary classification. Yin et al. [52] gave
similar adversarial risk bounds as Khim and Loh [26] through the lens of Rademacher
complexity. Although they provided risk bounds in multi-class setting, their work fo-
cused on l∞ adversarial attacks and was limited to one-hidden layer ReLU neural
networks. After the initial preprint of this paper, Khim and Loh [27] extended their
method to multi-class setting at the expense of incurring an extra factor of the num-
ber of classes in their bound. In contrast, our multi-class bound does not have explicit
dependence on this number. We hope that our method can provide new insight into
analysis of the adversarial risk bounds.
3 Problem Setup
We consider a standard statistical learning framework. Let Z = X × Y be a measur-
able instance space where X and Y represent feature and label spaces, respectively.
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We assume that examples are independently and identically distributed according to
some fixed but unknown distribution P . The learning problem is then formulated
as follows. The learner considers a class H of hypothesis h : X → Y and a loss
function l : Y × Y → R+. The learner receives n training examples denoted by
S = ((x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xn, yn)) drawn i.i.d. from P and tries to select a hy-
pothesis h ∈ H that has a small expected risk. However, in the presence of adver-
saries, there will be imperceptible perturbations to the input of examples, which are
called adversarial examples. We assume that the adversarial examples are generated
by adversarially choosing an example from neighborhoodN(x). We requireN(x) to
be nonempty and that some choice of examples is always available. Throughout this
paper, we assume that N(x) = {x′ : x′ − x ∈ B}, where B is a nonempty, closed,
convex, origin-symmetric set. Note that the definition ofB is very general and encom-
passes all lp -bounded adversaries when p ≥ 1. We next give the formal definition of
adversarial expected and empirical risk to measure the learner’s performance in the
presence of adversaries.
Definition 1. (Adversarial Expected Risk). The adversarial expected risk of a hypoth-
esis h ∈ H over the distribution P in the presence of an adversary constrained by B
is
RP (h,B) = E(x,y)∼P [ max
x′∈N(x)
l(h(x′), y)].
If B is the zero-dimensional space {0}, then the adversarial expected risk will
reduce to the standard expected risk without an adversary. Since the true distribution
is usually unknown, we instead use the empirical distribution to approximate the true
distribution, which is equal to (xi, yi) with probability 1/n for each i ∈ {1, · · · , n}.
That gives us the following definition of adversarial empirical risk.
Definition 2. (Adversarial Empirical Risk ). The adversarial empirical risk of h in the
presence of an adversary constrained by B is
RPn(h,B) = E(x,y)∼Pn [ max
x′∈N(x)
l(h(x′), y)],
where Pn represents the empirical distribution.
In the next section, we derive the adversarial risk bounds.
4 Main Results
In this section, we present our main results. The trick is to pushforward the origi-
nal distribution P into a new distribution P ′ using a transport map Th : Z → Z
satisfying
RP (h,B) = RP ′(h),
whereRP ′(h) = E(x,y)∼P ′l(h(x), y) is the standard expected risk without the adver-
sary. Therefore, an upper bound on the expected risk over the new distribution leads
to an upper bound on the adversarial expected risk.
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Note that the new distributionP ′ is not fixed and depends on the hypothesish. As
a result, traditional statistical learning cannot be directly applied. However, note that
these new distributions lie within a Wasserstein ball centered on P . If we consider
the worst case within this Wasserstein ball, then the original adversarial learning
problem can be reduced to a minimax problem. We can therefore use the minimax
approach to derive the adversarial risk bound. We first introduce the Wasserstein
distance and minimax framework.
4.1 Wasserstein Distance and Local Worst-case Risk
Let (Z, dZ) be a metric space where Z = X × Y and dZ is defined as
dpZ(z, z
′) = dpZ((x, y), (x
′, y′)) = (dpX (x, x
′) + dpY(y, y
′))
with dX and dY representing the metric in the feature space and label space respec-
tively. For example, if Y = {1,−1}, dY(y, y′) can be 1(y 6=y′), and if Y = [−B,B],
dY(y, y′) can be (y − y′)2. In this paper, we require that dX is translation invariant,
i.e., dX (x, x′) = dX (x− x′, 0). With this metric, we denote with P(Z) the space of
all Borel probability measures onZ , and with Pp(Z) the space of all P ∈ P(Z) with
finite pth moments for p ≥ 1:
Pp(Z) := {P ∈ P(Z) : EP [dpZ(z, z0)] <∞ for z0 ∈ Z}.
Then, the pth Wasserstein distance between two probability measures P,Q ∈ Pp(Z)
is defined as
Wp(P,Q) := inf
M∈Γ(P,Q)
(EM [d
p
Z(z, z
′)])1/p,
where Γ(P,Q) denotes the collection of all measures onZ×Z with marginals P and
Q on the first and second factors, respectively.
Now we define the local worst-case risk of h at P ,
Rǫ,p(P, h) := sup
Q∈BWǫ,p(P )
RQ(h),
whereBWǫ,p(P ) := {Q ∈ Pp(Z) :Wp(P,Q)) ≤ ǫ} is the p-Wasserstein ball of radius
ǫ ≥ 0 centered at P .
With these definitions, we next show the adversarial expected risk can be related
to the local worst-case risk by a transport map Th.
4.2 Transport Map
Define a mapping Th : Z → Z
z = (x, y)→ (x∗, y),
where x∗ = argmaxx′∈N(x) l(h(x′), y). By the definition of dZ , it is easy to obtain
dZ((x, y), (x∗, y)) = dX (x, x∗). We now prove that the adversarial expected risk
can be related to the standard expected risk via the mapping Th.
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Lemma 1. Let P ′ = Th#P , the pushforward of P by Th, then we have
RP (h,B) = RP ′(h).
Proof. By the definition, we have
RP (h,B) = E(x,y)∼P [maxx′∈N(x) l(h(x′), y)]
= E(x,y)∼P [l(h(x∗), y)] = E(x,y)∼P ′ [l(h(x), y)]
So RP (h,B) = RP ′(h).
By this lemma, the adversarial expected risk over a distribution P is equivalent
to the standard expected risk over a new distribution P ′. However since the new dis-
tribution is not fixed and depends on the hypothesis h, traditional statistical learning
cannot be directly applied. Luckily, the following lemma proves that all these new
distributions locate within a Wasserstein ball centered at P .
Lemma 2. Define the radius of the adversary B as ǫB := supx∈B dX (x, 0). For any
hypothesis h and the corresponding P ′ = Th#P , we have
Wp(P,P
′) ≤ ǫB.
Proof. By the definition of Wasserstein distance,
W pp (P,P
′) ≤ EP [dpZ(Z, Th(Z))] = EP [dpX (x, x∗)] ≤ ǫpB,
where the last inequality uses the translation invariant property of dX . Therefore,
we haveWp(P,P ′) ≤ ǫB.
From this lemma, we can see that all possible new distributions lie within a
Wasserstein ball of radius ǫB centered on P . So, by upper bounding the worst-case
risk in the ball, we can bound the adversarial expected risk. The relationship be-
tween local worst-case risk and adversarial expected risk is as follows. Note that this
inequality holds for any p ≥ 1. So, in the rest of the paper, we only discuss the case
p = 1; that is,
RP (h,B) ≤ RǫB,1(P, h), ∀h ∈ H. (1)
4.3 Adversarial Risk Bounds
In this subsection, we first prove a bound for the local worst-case risk. Then, the
adversarial risk bounds can be derived directly by (1). For the convenience of our
discussion, we denote a function classF by compositing the functions inH with the
loss function l(·, ·), i.e., F = {(x, y) → l(h(x), y) : h ∈ H}. The key ingredient of
a bound on the local worst-case risk is the following strong duality result after Gao
and Kleywegt [19]:
Proposition 1. For any upper semicontinuous function f : Z → R and for any P ∈
Pp(Z),
RǫB,1(P, f) = min
λ≥0
{λǫB + EP [ϕλ,f (z)]},
where ϕλ,f (z) := supz′∈Z{f(z′)− λ · dZ(z, z′)}.
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We begin with some assumptions.
Assumption 1. The instance spaceZ is bounded: diam(Z) := supz,z′∈Z dZ(z, z′) <
∞.
Assumption 2. The functions in F are upper semicontinuous and uniformly bounded:
0 ≤ f(z) ≤M <∞ for all f ∈ F and z ∈ Z .
Assumption 3. For any function f ∈ F and any z ∈ Z , there exists a constant λ such
that f(z′)− f(z) ≤ λdZ(z, z′) for any z′ ∈ Z .
Note that Assumption 3 is aweak version of Lipschitz condition since the constant
λ is not fixed and depends on f and z. It is easy to see that if the function f ∈ F is L-
Lipschitz with respect to the metric dZ , i.e., |f(z)−f(z′)| ≤ LdZ(z, z′), Assumption
3 automatically holds with λ always being L. Assumption 3 is very straightforward.
But it is not easy to use for our proof. For this sake, we give an equivalent expression
to Assumption 3 in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Assumption 3 holds if and only if for any function f ∈ F and any em-
pirical distribution Pn, the set {λ : ψf,Pn(λ) = 0} is nonempty, where ψf,Pn(λ) :=
EPn(supz′∈Z{f(z′)− λdZ(z, z′)− f(z)}).
The proof of this lemma is contained in Appendix A.
We denote the smallest value in the set as λ+f,Pn := inf{λ : ψf,Pn(λ) = 0}. In
order to prove the local worst-case risk bound, we need two technical lemmas.
Lemma 4. Fix some f ∈ F . Define λ¯ via
λ¯ := argmin
λ≥0
{λǫB + EPn [ϕλ,f (Z)]}.
Then
λ¯ ∈


[0,
M
ǫB
] if ǫB ≥ M
λ+f,Pn
[λ−f,Pn , λ
+
f,Pn
] if ǫB <
M
λ+f,Pn
, (2)
where λ−f,Pn := sup{λ : ψf,Pn(λ) = λ+f,Pn · ǫB} if the set {λ : ψf,Pn(λ) = λ+f,Pn · ǫB}
is nonempty, otherwise λ−f,Pn := 0.
Proof. If ǫB ≥ M
λ+f,Pn
, by Proposition 1, RǫB,1(Pn, f) = λ¯ǫB + EPn [ϕλ¯,f (Z)] , we
have
λ¯ǫB ≤ RǫB,1(Pn, f).
Since f(z) ≤M for any z, we get RǫB,1(Pn, f) ≤M . So λ¯ ≤
M
ǫB
.
For the other side, we first show that ψf,Pn(λ) is continuous and monotonically
non-increasing. The monotonicity is easy to verify from the definition. For continu-
ity, for any λ2 > λ1, suppose that
zˆ = supz′∈Z{f(z′)− λ1dZ(z, z′)− f(z)}),
z∗ = supz′∈Z{f(z′)− λ2dZ(z, z′)− f(z)}).
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Then we have
ψf,Pn(λ1)− ψf,Pn(λ2)
= EPn(supz′∈Z{f(z′)− λ1dZ(z, z′)− f(z)}−
supz′∈Z{f(z′)− λ2dZ(z, z′)− f(z)})
≤ Epn ((λ2 − λ1)dZ(z, zˆ)) ≤ (λ2 − λ1)diam(Z)
.
So ψf,Pn(λ) is diam(Z)-Lipschitz and thus continuous.
Now we prove λ¯ ∈ [λ−f,Pn , λ+f,Pn ]. If λ > λ+f,Pn , by the monotonicity and non-
negativity of ψf,Pn(λ), we have ψf,Pn(λ) = ψf,Pn(λ
+
f,Pn
) = 0, which implies λǫB +
EPn [ϕλ,f (z)] ≥ λ+f,PnǫB + EPn [ϕλ+f,Pn ,f (z)]. Therefore the optimal λ¯ ≤ λ
+
f,Pn
. To
show λ¯ ≥ λ−f,Pn , first notice that ψf,Pn(λ) belongs to [0,M ] for any λ. We define
λ−f,Pn := sup{λ : ψf,Pn(λ) = λ+f,Pn · ǫB}.
Note that this set {λ : ψf,Pn(λ) = λ+f,Pn · ǫB} might be empty if ψf,Pn(0) <
λ+f,Pn · ǫB < M . In this case, we just let λ−f,Pn = 0, and λ¯ must belong to [0, λ+f,Pn ].
Otherwise, there must exist some λ ∈ [0, λ+f,Pn ]which satisfies ψf,Pn(λ) = λ+f,Pn ·ǫB
by the intermediate value theorem of a continuous function. We choose λ−f,Pn to be
themaximal one in that set. Then, for any λ < λ−f,Pn , sinceψf,Pn(λ) is monotonically
non-increasing, we have
EPn( sup
z′∈Z
{f(z′)− λdZ(z, z′)− f(z)}) ≥ λ+f,Pn · ǫB.
By rearranging the items on both sides, we obtain
λǫB + EPn [ϕλ,f (z)] ≥ λ+f,Pn · ǫB + EPn(f(z))
for any λ < λ−f,Pn . Therefore, λ¯ ≥ λ−f,Pn , and we complete the proof.
Remark 1. We can show limǫB→0 λ
−
f,Pn
= λ+f,Pn by using (ǫ, δ) language as fol-
lows. ∀ǫ, define δ = ψf,Pn (λ
+
f,Pn
−ǫ)
λ+
f,Pn
. Then, for any ǫB < δ, we have ψf,Pn(λ
+
f,Pn
−
ǫ) > λ+f,Pn · ǫB. By the definition of λ−f,Pn , ψf,Pn(λ−f,Pn) = λ+f,Pn · ǫB. Since
ψf,Pn(λ) is monotonically non-increasing, we have λ
−
f,Pn
> λ+f,Pn − ǫ. Therefore,
limǫB→0 λ
−
f,Pn
= λ+f,Pn .
Lemma 5. Define the function classΦ := {ϕλ,f : λ ∈ [a, b], f ∈ F}where b ≥ a ≥ 0.
Then, the expected Rademacher complexity of the function class Φ satisfies
Rn(Φ) ≤ 12C(F)√
n
+
6
√
π√
n
(b− a) · diam(Z),
where C(F) := ∫∞0 √logN (F , || · ||∞, u/2)du and N (F , || · ||∞, u/2) denotes the
covering number of F .
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The proof of this lemma is contained in Appendix B.
The following theorem gives the generalization bound for the local worst-case
risk. We first introduce the corresponding notation: λ¯ ∈ [ζ−f,Pn , ζ+f,Pn ] denotes expres-
sion (2), [ζ−, ζ+] :=
⋃
f,Pn
[ζ−f,Pn , ζ
+
f,Pn
] and ΛǫB := ζ
+− ζ−. It is straightforward to
check that [ζ−, ζ+] ⊂ [0,M/ǫB ] from expression (2).
Theorem 1. If the assumptions 1- 3 hold, then for any f ∈ F , we have
RǫB,1(P, f)−RǫB,1(Pn, f) ≤
24C(F)√
n
+M
√
log(1δ )
2n
+
12
√
π√
n
ΛǫB · diam(Z)
with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof. For any f ∈ F , define
λ¯ := argmin
λ≥0
{λǫB + EPn [ϕλ,f (Z)]}.
Then using Proposition 1, we can write
RǫB,1(P, f)−RǫB,1(Pn, f)
= minλ≥0
{
λǫB +
∫
Z
ϕλ,f (z)P (dz)
}
−
(
λ¯ǫB+∫
Z
ϕλ¯,f (z)Pn(dz)
)
≤
∫
Z
ϕλ¯,f (z)(P − Pn)(dz).
By lemma 4, we have λ¯ ∈ [ζ−f,Pn , ζ+f,Pn ]. Define the function class Φ := {ϕλ,f : λ ∈
[ζ−, ζ+], f ∈ F}. Then, we have
RǫB,1(P, f)−RǫB,1(Pn, f) ≤ sup
ϕ∈Φ
[∫
Z
ϕ(z)(P − Pn)(dz)
]
.
Since all f ∈ F takes values in [0,M ], the same holds for all ϕ ∈ Φ. Therefore, by a
standard symmetrization argument [35],
RǫB,1(P, f)−RǫB,1(Pn, f) ≤ 2Rn(Φ) +M
√
log(1/δ)
2n
with probability at least 1 − δ, where Rn(Φ) := E[supϕ∈Φ
1
n
∑n
i=1 σiϕ(zi)] is the
expected Rademacher complexity of Φ. Using the bound of lemma 4, we get the
following result
RǫB,1(P, f)−RǫB,1(Pn, f) ≤
24C(F)√
n
+M
√
log(1δ )
2n
+
12
√
π√
n
ΛǫB · diam(Z)
.
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Remark 2. Lee and Raginsky [30] prove a bound with [ζ−, ζ+] = [0, L] under
the Lipschitz assumption with L representing the Lipschitz constant. Our result
improves a lot on theirs. First, our Assumption 3 is weaker than the Lipschitz as-
sumption in Lee and Raginsky [30]. Second, even under our weaker assumptions,
our bound is still better than that of Lee and Raginsky [30] for the case ǫB ≥ M/L
since [ζ−, ζ+] ⊂ [0,M/ǫB] ⊂ [0, L]. Third, if further assuming the same Lipschitz
condition as Lee and Raginsky [30], we can get [ζ−, ζ+] ⊂ [0, L] by the definition of
ζ− and ζ+, which is always better than the ones in Lee and Raginsky [30]. Finally, the
term
12
√
π√
n
ΛǫB · diam(Z) in our bound will vanish as ǫB → ∞ or ǫB = 0 whereas
Lee and Raginsky [30] give a ǫB-free bound with ΛǫB always being a constant L.
This leads to the following upper bound on the adversarial expected risk.
Corollary 1. With the conditions in Theorem 1, for any f ∈ F , we have
RP (f,B) ≤ 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(zi) + min
λ≥0
{λǫB + ψf,Pn(λ)}+
24C(F)√
n
+
12
√
π√
n
ΛǫBdiam(Z) +M
√
log(1δ )
2n
(3)
and
RP (f,B) ≤ 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(zi) + λ
+
f,Pn
ǫB +
24C(F)√
n
+
12
√
π√
n
ΛǫB · diam(Z) +M
√
log(1δ )
2n
(4)
with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof. By Proposition 1, RǫB,1(Pn, f) can be written as
RǫB,1(Pn, f)
= min
λ≥0
{λǫB + EPn [ϕλ,f (z)]}
= min
λ≥0
{λǫB + EPn [ϕλ,f (z) − f(z)]} + EPn [f(z)]
= min
λ≥0
{λǫB + ψf,Pn(λ)}+
1
n
n∑
i=1
f(zi)
,
where the last equality uses the definition of ψf,Pn(λ). Substituting the above equa-
tion into Theorem 1, we get result (3). To obtain (4), we can make use of the following
inequality
min
λ≥0
{λǫB + ψf,Pn(λ)} ≤ λ+f,PnǫB + ψf,Pn(λ+f,Pn)
= λ+f,PnǫB
,
where the equality follows from the definition of λ+f,Pn .
Remark 3. We are interested in how the adversarial risk bounds differ from the case
in which the adversary is absent. Plugging ǫB = 0 into inequality (4) yields the usual
generalization of the form
RP (h) ≤ 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(zi) +
24C(F)√
n
+M
√
log(1/δ)
2n
.
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So the effect of an adversary is to introduce an extra complexity term 12
√
πΛǫB ·
diam(Z)/
√
n and an additional linear term on ǫB which contributes to the empirical
risk.
Remark 4. As mentioned in Remark 2, the extra complexity term will decrease as
ǫB gets bigger if ǫB ≥ M/λ+f,Pn , indicating that a stronger adversary might have a
negative impact on the hypothesis class complexity. This is intuitive, since different
hypotheses might have the same performance in the presence of a strong adversary
and, therefore, the hypothesis class complexity will decrease. We emphasize that this
phenomenon does not occur in our concurrent work Khim and Loh [26] and Yin et al.
[52]. In both of their work, this term will increase linearly as ǫB grows.
Remark 5. We should point out that λ+f,Pn is data-dependent and might be difficult
to compute exactly. Luckily we can upper bound it easily. For example, if f is L-
Lipschitz, by the definition of λ+f,Pn , we have λ
+
f,Pn
≤ L. See Section 5 for more
examples. In particular, if ψf,Pn(λ) ≡ 0 for any λ ≥ 0, we get λ+f,Pn = 0, and the
additional term λ+f,PnǫB in (4) will disappear.
5 Example Bounds
In this section, we illustrate the application of Corollary 1 to several commonly-used
models: SVMs, neural networks, and PCA.
5.1 Support Vector Machines
We first start with SVMs. Let Z = X × Y , where the feature space X = {x ∈ Rd :
||x||2 ≤ r} and the label space Y = {−1,+1}. Equip Z with the Euclidean metric
dZ(z, z′) = dZ((x, y), (x′, y′)) = ||x− x′||2 + 1(y 6=y′).
Consider the hypothesis space F = {(x, y)→ max{0, 1 − yh(x)} : h ∈ H}, where
H = {x → w · x : ||w||2 ≤ Λ}. We can now derive the expected risk bound for
SVMs in the presence of an adversary.
Corollary 2. For the SVM setting considered above, for any f ∈ F , with probability
at least 1− δ,
RP (f,B) ≤ 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(zi) + λ
+
f,Pn
ǫB +
144√
n
Λr
√
d+
12
√
π√
n
ΛǫB · (2r + 1) + (1 + Λr)
√
log(1δ )
2n
,
where λ+f,Pn ≤ maxi {2yiw · xi, ||w||2}.
The proof of Corollary 2 can be found in Appendix C.
Our result can easily be extended to kernel SVM. Here, we take a Gaussian ker-
nel as an example. Let K : X × X → R be a Gaussian kernel with K(x1, x2) =
exp(−||x1 − x2||22/σ2). Let τ : X → H be a feature mapping associated withK and
12
H = {x → 〈w, τ(x)〉 : ||w||H ≤ Λ}, where 〈·, ·〉 is the inner product in the repro-
ducing kernel Hilbert space H and || · ||H is the induced norm. Suppose X ⊆ Rd is
compact and the space Z is equipped with the metric
dZ(z, z′) = ||τ(x) − τ(x′)||H + 1(y 6=y′)
for z = (x, y) and z′ = (x′, y′). It is easy to show that dX = ||τ(x) − τ(x′)||H is
translation invariant from Gaussian kernel definition. To apply Corollary 1, we must
calculate the covering numbers N (F , || · ||∞, ·). To this end, we embed H into the
space C(X ) of continuous real-valued functions on X denoted by IK(H) equipped
with the sup norm ||h||X := supx∈X |h(x)|.
We can now derive the adversarial risk bounds for the Gaussian-kernel SVM.
Corollary 3. For the Gaussian-kernel SVM described above, for any f ∈ F , with
probability at least 1− δ,
RP (f,B) ≤ 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(zi) + λ
+
f,Pn
ǫB +
24√
n
Λ
√
dC3+
30
√
π√
n
ΛǫB + (1 + Λ)
√
log(1/δ)
2n
,
whereλ+f,Pn ≤ maxi {2yi〈w, τ(xi)〉, ||w||H} ≤ 2||w||H ,C3 = (32+
1280d
σ2
)
d+1
2 (2Γ(d+32 ,
log 2) + (log 2)
d+1
2 ), and Γ(s, v) :=
∫∞
v u
s−1e−udu is the incomplete gamma func-
tion.
The proof of Corollary 3 can be found in Appendix C.
Remark 6. A margin bound for SVM in the multi-class setting can be derived in
similar way. So we omit the proof.
5.2 Neural Networks
Wenext consider feed-forwardneural networks. To demonstrate the generality of our
method, we consider amulti-class prediction problem. We first define some notations.
Let Z = X × Y , where the feature space X = {x ∈ Rd : ||x||2 ≤ B} and the label
space Y = {1, 2, · · · , k}; k represents the number of classes. The network uses L
fixed nonlinear activation functions (σ1, σ2, · · · , σL), where σi is ρi-Lipschitz and
satisfies σi(0) = 0. Given L weight matrices A = (A1, A2, · · · , AL), the network
computes the following function
HA(x) := σL(ALσL−1(AL−1σL−2(· · · σ2(A2σ1(A1x)·)),
where Ai ∈ Rdi×di−1 and HA : Rd → Rk with d0 = d and dL = k. Let W =
max{d0, d1, · · · , dL}. Define a margin operatorM : Rk × {1, 2, · · · , k} → R as
M(v, y) := vy −maxj 6=y vj and the ramp loss lγ : R→ R+ as
lγ :=


0 r < −γ
1 + r/γ r ∈ [−γ, 0]
1 r > 0
.
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Consider the hypothesis class F = {(x, y) → lγ(−M(HA(x), y)) : A =
(A1, A2, · · · , AL), ||Ai||σ ≤ si, ||Ai||F ≤ bi}, where || · ||σ represents spectral norm
and || · ||F denotes the Frobenius norm. The metric in space Z is defined as
dZ(z, z′) = dZ((x, y), (x′, y′)) = ||x− x′||2 + 1(y 6=y′).
Now we derive the adversarial expected risk for neural networks.
Corollary 4. For the neural network setting defined above, for any f ∈ F , with prob-
ability of 1− δ, the following inequality holds
RP (f,B) ≤ 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(zi) + λ
+
f,Pn
ǫB +
√
log(1/δ)
2n
+
288
γ
√
n
∏L
i=1 ρisiBW
(∑L
i=1
(
bi
si
)1/2)2
+
12
√
π√
n
ΛǫB · (2B + 1)
,
whereλ+f,Pn ≤ maxj
{
2
γ
L∏
i=1
ρi||Ai||σ, 1
γ
(M(HA(xj), yj)+maxHA(xj)−minHA(xj))
}
.
The proof of this Corollary is provided in Appendix D.
Remark 7. Setting ǫB = 0, we can obtain a risk bound for neural networks in
terms of the spectral norm and the Frobenius norm of the weight matrices; see (5).
Although the result (5) is similar to the results in Bartlett et al. [6] and Neyshabur
et al. [36], the proof technique is different. We hope that our approach provides a
different perspective on the generalization analysis of deep neural networks.
RP (f) ≤ 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(zi) +
√
log(1/δ)
2n
+
288
γ
√
n
∏L
i=1 ρisiBW
(∑L
i=1
(
bi
si
)1/2)2
.
(5)
5.3 Principal Component Analysis
Until now we consider the adversarial learning problem in a supervised learning set-
ting. In this example, we show that our approach could be easily extended to unsu-
pervised learning setting, namely the principal component analysis. We formalize
PCA as follows. Fix k ∈ [1,m] and letZ ⊂ Rm such thatmaxz∈Z ||z||2 ≤ B. Define
T k as the set ofm-dimensional rank-k orthogonal projection matrices. PCA consists
of projecting the m-dimensional input data onto a k-dimensional linear subspace
which minimizes reconstruction error, and the hypothesis space for PCA is defined
as F = {z → ||Tz − z||22 : T ∈ T k}. Note that the definition for adversarial ex-
pected and empirical risk in supervised learning setting given in Section 3 applies
automatically to PCA, and the adversarial expected risk bound for PCA is given as
follows.
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Corollary 5. For PCA we define above, for any f ∈ F , with probability of 1 − δ, the
following inequality holds
RP (f,B) ≤ 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(zi) + λ
+
f,Pn
ǫB +
576B2k
√
m√
n
+
24B
√
π√
n
ΛǫB +B
2
√
log(1/δ)
2n
,
where λ+f,Pn ≤ maxi {B + ||Tzi − zi||2}.
The proof of this Corollary can be founded in Appendix E.
Remark 8. For each example in this Section, we provide a data-dependent upper
bound for λ+f,Pn . This upper bound can be used for optimizing the adversarial risk
bounds, as discussed in Section 6.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a theoretical method for deriving adversarial risk bounds.
While our method is general and can easily be applied to multi-class problems and
most of the commonly used loss functions, the bound might be loose in some cases.
This is mainly because we always consider the worst case so that we avoid the prob-
lem of solving the transport map. However, for some simple problems, deriving the
transport map directly might provide a better bound. The other reason is that we
use covering numbers instead of the expected Rademacher complexity as our upper
bounds, weakening our results. It can be seen thatwe have an unavoidable dimension
dependency. We speculate that this dependency might be avoided by replacing the
covering numbers in our bounds with the Rademacher complexity of the hypothesis
class, which we will address in future studies.
In the future, one interesting problem is to develop adversarial robust algorithms
based on our results. For example, our bounds suggest that minimizing the sum of
empirical risk and the term λ+f,PnǫB can help achieve adversarial robustness. How-
ever, in practice, λ+f,Pn is usually unknown, and we only have an upper bound for
λ+f,Pn . Thus, we can perform a grid search of a regularization parameter η on the in-
terval [0, 1] and replace λ+f,Pn with its’s upper bound multiplied by η in the objective
function. Then we minimize this new objective function for each possible regulariza-
tion parameter and at the end pick the solution with the minimum value of the new
objective function.
References
[1] Alabdulmohsin, I. M. (2015). Algorithmic stability and uniform generalization.
In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 19–27.
[2] Ambroladze, A., Parrado-Hernández, E., and Shawe-taylor, J. S. (2007). Tighter
pac-bayes bounds. In Advances in neural information processing systems, pages
9–16.
15
[3] Arora, S., Ge, R., Neyshabur, B., and Zhang, Y. (2018). Stronger generalization
bounds for deep nets via a compression approach. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.05296.
[4] Athalye, A., Carlini, N., and Wagner, D. (2018). Obfuscated gradients give a false
sense of security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1802.00420.
[5] Bartlett, P. L., Bousquet, O., Mendelson, S., et al. (2005). Local rademacher com-
plexities. The Annals of Statistics, 33(4):1497–1537.
[6] Bartlett, P. L., Foster, D. J., and Telgarsky, M. J. (2017). Spectrally-normalized
margin bounds for neural networks. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, pages 6240–6249.
[7] Bartlett, P. L. and Mendelson, S. (2002). Rademacher and gaussian complexi-
ties: Risk bounds and structural results. Journal of Machine Learning Research,
3(Nov):463–482.
[8] Biggio, B., Corona, I., Maiorca, D., Nelson, B., Šrndić, N., Laskov, P., Giacinto, G.,
and Roli, F. (2013). Evasion attacks against machine learning at test time. In Joint
European conference on machine learning and knowledge discovery in databases,
pages 387–402. Springer.
[9] Biggio, B., Nelson, B., and Laskov, P. (2012). Poisoning attacks against support
vector machines. arXiv preprint arXiv:1206.6389.
[10] Biggio, B. and Roli, F. (2018). Wild patterns: Ten years after the rise of adversar-
ial machine learning. Pattern Recognition, 84:317–331.
[11] Bousquet, O. and Elisseeff, A. (2002). Stability and generalization. Journal of
machine learning research, 2(Mar):499–526.
[12] Courty, N., Flamary, R., Tuia, D., and Rakotomamonjy, A. (2017). Optimal trans-
port for domain adaptation. IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and machine
intelligence, 39(9):1853–1865.
[13] Cucker, F. and Zhou, D. X. (2007). Learning theory: an approximation theory
viewpoint, volume 24. Cambridge University Press.
[14] Cullina, D., Bhagoji, A. N., and Mittal, P. (2018). Pac-learning in the presence of
adversaries. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 228–239.
[15] Dalvi, N., Domingos, P., Sanghai, S., Verma, D., et al. (2004). Adversarial clas-
sification. In Proceedings of the tenth ACM SIGKDD international conference on
Knowledge discovery and data mining, pages 99–108. ACM.
[16] Dekel, O., Shamir, O., and Xiao, L. (2010). Learning to classify with missing and
corrupted features. Machine learning, 81(2):149–178.
16
[17] Farnia, F. and Tse, D. (2016). A minimax approach to supervised learning. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 4240–4248.
[18] Fawzi, A., Moosavi-Dezfooli, S.-M., and Frossard, P. (2016). Robustness of clas-
sifiers: from adversarial to random noise. In Advances in Neural Information Pro-
cessing Systems, pages 1632–1640.
[19] Gao, R. and Kleywegt, A. J. (2016). Distributionally robust stochastic optimiza-
tion with wasserstein distance. arXiv preprint arXiv:1604.02199.
[20] Gilmer, J., Metz, L., Faghri, F., Schoenholz, S. S., Raghu, M., Wattenberg, M., and
Goodfellow, I. (2018). Adversarial spheres. arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.02774.
[21] Globerson, A. and Roweis, S. (2006). Nightmare at test time: robust learning
by feature deletion. In Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Machine
learning, pages 353–360. ACM.
[22] Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., and Szegedy, C. (2014). Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572.
[23] Gu, S. and Rigazio, L. (2014). Towards deep neural network architectures robust
to adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.5068.
[24] Hein, M. and Andriushchenko, M. (2017). Formal guarantees on the robustness
of a classifier against adversarial manipulation. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pages 2266–2276.
[25] Herbrich, R. and Williamson, R. C. (2002). Algorithmic luckiness. Journal of
Machine Learning Research, 3(Sep):175–212.
[26] Khim, J. and Loh, P.-L. (2018a). Adversarial risk bounds for binary classification
via function transformation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.09519.
[27] Khim, J. and Loh, P.-L. (2018b). Adversarial risk bounds via function transfor-
mation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.09519v2.
[28] Langford, J. (2005). Tutorial on practical prediction theory for classification.
Journal of machine learning research, 6(Mar):273–306.
[29] Lee, J. and Raginsky, M. (2017). Minimax statistical learning and domain adap-
tation with wasserstein distances. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.07815.
[30] Lee, J. and Raginsky, M. (2018). Minimax statistical learning with wasserstein
distances. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 2692–2701.
[31] Liu, T., Lugosi, G., Neu, G., and Tao, D. (2017). Algorithmic stability and hypoth-
esis complexity. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.08712.
17
[32] Lowd, D. and Meek, C. (2005a). Adversarial learning. In Proceedings of the
eleventh ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery in data
mining, pages 641–647. ACM.
[33] Lowd, D. and Meek, C. (2005b). Good word attacks on statistical spam filters. In
CEAS, volume 2005.
[34] Madry, A., Makelov, A., Schmidt, L., Tsipras, D., and Vladu, A. (2018). Towards
deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. In International Conference
on Learning Representations.
[35] Mohri, M., Rostamizadeh, A., and Talwalkar, A. (2012). Foundations of machine
learning. MIT press.
[36] Neyshabur, B., Bhojanapalli, S., McAllester, D., and Srebro, N. (2017). A pac-
bayesian approach to spectrally-normalized margin bounds for neural networks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.09564.
[37] Raghunathan, A., Steinhardt, J., and Liang, P. (2018). Certified defenses against
adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.09344.
[38] Russo, D. and Zou, J. (2016). Controlling bias in adaptive data analysis using
information theory. In Gretton, A. and Robert, C. C., editors, Proceedings of the
19th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, volume 51 of
Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, pages 1232–1240, Cadiz, Spain. PMLR.
[39] Schmidt, L., Santurkar, S., Tsipras, D., Talwar, K., and Mądry, A. (2018). Adver-
sarially robust generalization requires more data. arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.11285.
[40] Shalev-Shwartz, S., Shamir, O., Srebro, N., and Sridharan, K. (2010). Learnabil-
ity, stability and uniform convergence. Journal of Machine Learning Research,
11(Oct):2635–2670.
[41] Sinha, A., Namkoong, H., and Duchi, J. (2018). Certifiable distributional robust-
ness with principled adversarial training. In International Conference on Learning
Representations.
[42] Suggala, A. S., Prasad, A., Nagarajan, V., and Ravikumar, P. (2018). On adversar-
ial risk and training. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.02924.
[43] Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I.,
and Fergus, R. (2013). Intriguing properties of neural networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1312.6199.
[44] Talagrand, M. (2014). Upper and lower bounds for stochastic processes: modern
methods and classical problems, volume 60. Springer Science & Business Media.
18
[45] Uesato, J., O’Donoghue, B., Oord, A. v. d., and Kohli, P. (2018). Adversar-
ial risk and the dangers of evaluating against weak attacks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1802.05666.
[46] Vapnik, V. (2013). The nature of statistical learning theory. Springer science &
business media.
[47] Vapnik, V. N. (1999). An overview of statistical learning theory. IEEE transactions
on neural networks, 10(5):988–999.
[48] Wang, Y., Jha, S., and Chaudhuri, K. (2017). Analyzing the robustness of nearest
neighbors to adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.03922.
[49] Wong, E. and Kolter, Z. (2018). Provable defenses against adversarial examples
via the convex outer adversarial polytope. In International Conference on Machine
Learning, pages 5283–5292.
[50] Xu, A. and Raginsky, M. (2017). Information-theoretic analysis of generalization
capability of learning algorithms. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, pages 2524–2533.
[51] Xu, H. and Mannor, S. (2012). Robustness and generalization. Machine learning,
86(3):391–423.
[52] Yin, D., Ramchandran, K., and Bartlett, P. (2018). Rademacher complexity for
adversarially robust generalization. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.11914.
[53] Zhang, J., Liu, T., and Tao, D. (2018). An Information-Theoretic View for Deep
Learning. ArXiv e-prints.
[54] Zhang, T. (2002). Covering number bounds of certain regularized linear function
classes. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 2(Mar):527–550.
[55] Zhou, D.-X. (2002). The covering number in learning theory. Journal of Com-
plexity, 18(3):739–767.
19
A Proof of Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3. We first prove =⇒ . For any f ∈ F and any empirical distribution
zi ∼ Pn, by Assumption 3, there exists a constant λf,zi such that f(z′) − f(zi) ≤
λf,zidZ(zi, z
′) for any z′ ∈ Z , which leads to supz′∈Z{f(z′) − λf,zidZ(zi, z′) −
f(zi)}) = 0. Letλ∗ = maxi{λzi,f}. Then, for any zi ∼ Pn, we have supz′∈Z{f(z′)−
λ∗dZ(zi, z′)−f(zi)}) = 0. Therefore, ψf,Pn(λ∗) = 0 and the set {λ : ψf,Pn(λ) = 0}
is nonempty.⇐= can be directly derived from the definition.
B Proof of Lemma 5
Proof of Lemma 5. Define the Φ-indexed processX = (Xϕ)ϕ∈Φ by
Xϕ :=
1√
n
n∑
i=1
σiϕ(zi).
Note that E[Xϕ] = 0 for all ϕ ∈ Φ. First we show that X is a subgaussian process
with respect to the pseudometric dΦ(ϕ,ϕ′), defined as
dΦ(ϕ,ϕ
′) := ||f − f ′||∞ + (diam(Z))|λ − λ′|
for ϕ = ϕλ,f and ϕ
′ = ϕλ′,f ′ . From the definition of ϕλ,f , it is easy to show that
||ϕ− ϕ′||∞ ≤ dΦ(ϕ,ϕ′). Then for any t ∈ R, we can get
E
[
exp(t(Xϕ −X ′ϕ))
]
= E
[
exp(
t√
n
∑n
i=1 σi(ϕ(zi)− ϕ′(zi)))
]
=
(
E
[
exp(
t√
n
σ1(ϕ(z1)− ϕ′(z1))
])n
≤ exp
(
t2d2Φ(ϕ,ϕ
′)
2
)
,
where the second equality is by the fact that (σi, zi) are i.i.d., and the final inequal-
ity uses Hoeffding’s lemma. Therefore, X is subgaussian with respect to dΦ. And
the expected Rademacher complexityRn(Φ) can be bounded by the Dudley entropy
integral [44]:
Rn(Φ) ≤ 12√
n
∫ ∞
0
√
logN (Φ, dΦ, u)du,
where N (Φ, dΦ, ·) represents the covering numbers of (Φ, dΦ). By the definition of
dΦ, it follows that
N (Φ, dΦ, u) ≤ N (F , || · ||∞, u/2) · N ([a, b], | · |, u
2diam(Z)
)
and therefore
Rn(Φ) ≤ 12√
n
(∫ ∞
0
√
logN (F , || · ||∞, u/2)du+∫ ∞
0
√
logN ([a, b], | · |, u/(2diam(Z)))du
) .
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The second integral term could be easily obtained as follows∫ ∞
0
√
logN ([a, b], | · |, u/(2diam(Z)))du
≤ (b− a) · diam(z)
∫ 1
0
√
log
1
u
du
=
√
π
2
(b− a) · diam(z)
.
Consequently,
Rn(Φ) ≤ 12√
n
∫ ∞
0
√
logN (F , || · ||∞, u/2)du+
6
√
π√
n
(b− a) · diam(Z)
.
C Proofs of Corollary 2 and Corollary 3
Proof of Corollary 2. We first verify the assumption conditions in Theorem 1. Assump-
tion 1 is evidently satisfied since diam(Z) ≤ (2r + 1). For each f ∈ F , assumption
2 holds withM = 1 + Λr. To verify assumption 3, we can write
f(z′)− f(z) ≤ max{0, yw · x− y′w · x′}
≤ max{0, 2yw · x1(y 6=y′) + ||w||2||x′ − x||2}
≤ max{2yw · x, ||w||2}dZ(z, z′)
.
So λ+f,Pn ≤ maxi {2yiw · xi, ||w||2} and assumption 3 holds.
To evaluate the Dudley entropy integral, we need to estimate the covering num-
bersN (F , || · ||∞, u/2). First observe, for any f1, f2 ∈ F , we have
||f1 − f2||∞ = supx∈X ,y∈Y |f1(x, y)− f2(x, y)|
≤ supx∈X ,y∈Y |yw1 · x− yw2 · x| ≤ ||w1 − w2||2r.
Since w1, w2 belong to a Λ-ball inRd,
N (F , || · ||∞, u/2) ≤
(
6Λr
u
)d
for 0 < u < 2Λr, and N (F , || · ||∞, u/2) = 1 for u ≥ 2Λr, which gives∫ ∞
0
√
logN (F , || · ||∞, u/2)du
≤
∫ 2Λr
0
√
d log(
6Λr
u
)du ≤ 6Λr
√
d
.
Substituting this into expression (4), we get the desired result
RP (f,B) ≤ 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(zi) + λ
+
f,Pn
ǫB +
144√
n
Λr
√
d+
12
√
π√
n
ΛǫB · (2r + 1) + (1 + Λr)
√
log(1δ )
2n
.
To prove Corollary 3, we need the following Proposition [13].
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Proposition 2. For compact X ⊆ Rd,
logN (IK(H), || · ||X , u) ≤ dC2
(
log
Λ
u
)d+1
holds for all 0 < u ≤ Λ/2 where C2 = (32 + 640d(diam(X ))
2
σ2
)d+1.
Proof of Corollary 3. First note that ||τ(x′) − τ(x)||2
H
= 2 − 2K(x, x′) ≤ 2. So
assumption 1 holds with diam(Z) ≤ 5
2
. For any f ∈ F , assumption 2 holds with
M = 1 + Λ. For assumption 3, we have
f(z′)− f(z)
≤ max{0, y〈w, τ(x)〉 − y′〈w, τ(x′)〉}
≤ max{0, 2y〈w, τ(x)〉1(y 6=y′ ) + |〈w, τ(x) − τ(x′)〉}
≤ max{2y〈w, τ(x)〉, ||w||H}dZ(z, z′)
.
So λ+f,Pn ≤ maxi {2yi〈w, τ(xi)〉, ||w||H}.
Now we calculate the covering numbersN (F , || · ||∞, u/2). Observe that
||f1 − f2||∞ = supx∈X ,y∈Y |f1(x, y) − f2(x, y)|
≤ supx∈X |〈w1, x〉 − 〈w2, x〉| = ||w1 − w2||X .
So ∫ ∞
0
√
logN (F , || · ||∞, u/2)du
≤
∫ ∞
0
√
log(N (IK(H), || · ||X , u
2
)du
=
∫ 2Λ
0
√
log(N (IK(H), || · ||X , u
2
)du
≤
∫ Λ
0
√
log(N (IK(H), || · ||X , u
2
)du+∫ 2Λ
Λ
√
log(N (IK(H), || · ||X , Λ
2
)du
,
where the equality uses ||w||X ≤ Λ and the final inequality uses the monotonicity of
covering numbers. Using the bound from Proposition 2,∫ Λ
0
√
log(N (IK(H), || · ||X , u
2
)du
≤ √d
(
32 +
640d(diam(X ))2
σ2
) d+1
2
∫ Λ
0
(log
2Λ
u
)
d+1
2 du
= 2Λ
√
d
(
32 +
640d(diam(X ))2
σ2
) d+1
2
Γ(d+32 , log 2)
.
And ∫ 2Λ
Λ
√
log(N (IK(H), || · ||X , Λ
2
)du
= Λ
√
d
(
32 +
640d(diam(X ))2
σ2
)d+1
2
(log 2)
d+1
2 .
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Therefore, applying Corollary 1, we get
RP (f,B) ≤ 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(zi) + λ
+
f,Pn
ǫB +
24√
n
Λ
√
dC3+
30
√
π√
n
ΛǫB + (1 + Λ)
√
log(1/δ)
2n
.
D Proof of Corollary 4
The goal of this section is to prove the adversarial expected risk for neural networks.
To this end, it is necessary to first establish some properties of the margin operator
M(v, y) = vy −maxj 6=y vj and the ramp loss lγ .
Lemma D.1. For every j,M(·, j) is 2-Lipschitz with respect to || · ||2.
proof. Let u, v and y be given. IfM(u, y) ≥ M(v, y), denote the index j which
satisfies thatM(v, y) = vy − vj . Then,
M(u, y) −M(v, y) = uy −maxi 6=y ui − vy + vj
≤ uy − uj − vy + vj ≤ 2||u− v||∞ ≤ 2||u− v||2.
Otherwise, let j be the index satisfyingM(u, y) = uy − uj , and we obtain
−2||u− v||2 ≤M(u, y) −M(v, y).
Therefore,M(·, j) is 2-Lipschitz with respect to || · ||2.
LemmaD.2. For any f ∈ F , we haveλ+f,Pn ≤ C4 whereC4 := maxj{
2
γ
∏L
i=1 ρi||Ai||σ,
1
γ
(M(HA(xj), yj)+
maxHA(xj)−minHA(xj)
)}.
Proof. By the definition of f , for any z and z′, we have
f(z′)− f(z)
= lγ(−M(HA(x′), y′))− lγ(−M(HA(x), y))
≤ max{0, 1
γ
(M(HA(x), y)−M(HA(x′), y′))}
≤ max{0, 1
γ
(M(HA(x), y′)−M(HA(x′), y′))+
1
γ
(M(HA(x), y) −M(HA(x), y′))}
≤ max{0, 2
γ
|HA(x)−HA(x′)|+ 1
γ
(M(HA(x), y)−
M(HA(x), y′))}
≤ 2
γ
∏L
i=1 ρi||Ai||σ||x− x′||2 +
1
γ
(M(HA(x), y)+
maxHA(x)−minHA(x)
)
1y 6=y′
≤ C4dZ(z, z′)
.
where the third inequality uses Lemma C.1. Therefore, λ+f,Pn ≤ C4.
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LemmaD.3. For any two feedforward neural networkHA andHA′ whereA = (A1, A2, · · · , AL)
and A′ = (A′1, A′2, · · · , A′L), we have the following
||HA(x)−HA′(x)||2 ≤
L∏
i=1
ρisiB

 L∑
j=1
||Ai −A′i||σ
si

 .
Proof. We proof this by induction. Let∆i = ||HiA(x)−HiA′(x)||2. First observe
∆1 = ||σ1(A1x)− σ1(A′1x)||2 ≤ ρ1||A1x−A′1x||2
≤ ρ1||A1 −A′1||σ ||x||2 ≤ ρ1B||A1 −A′1||σ .
For any i ≥ 1, we have the following
∆i+1
= ||σi+1(Ai+1σi(Ai · · · σ2(A2σ1(A1x))))−
σi+1(A
′
i+1σi(A
′
i · · · σ2(A′2σ1(A′1x))))||2
≤ ||σi+1(Ai+1σi(Ai · · · σ2(A2σ1(A1x))))−
σi+1(A
′
i+1σi(Ai · · · σ2(A2σ1(A1x))))||2+
||σi+1(A′i+1σi(Ai · · · σ2(A2σ1(A1x)))−
σi+1(A
′
i+1σi(A
′
i · · · σ2(A′2σ1(A′1x))))||2
≤ ρi+1||Ai+1 −A′i+1||σ||σi(Ai · · · σ2(A2σ1(A1x)))||2+
ρi+1si+1∆i
≤ ρi+1||Ai+1 −A′i+1||σ
∏i
j=1 ρjsjB + ρi+1si+1∆i
.
Therefore, using the induction step, we get the following
∆i+1
≤ ρi+1||Ai+1 −A′i+1||σ
∏i
j=1 ρjsjB + ρi+1si+1∆i
≤ ρi+1||Ai+1 −A′i+1||σ
∏i
j=1 ρjsjB+∏i+1
j=1 ρjsjB
(∑i
k=1
||Ak −A′k||σ
sk
)
=
∏i+1
j=1 ρjsjB
(∑i+1
k=1
||Ak −A′k||σ
sk
)
.
We now return to the proof of Corollary 4.
Proof of Corollary 4. First we verify the three assumptions. Assumption 1 holds with
diam(Z) ≤ 2r+1. Assumption 2 is self-satisfied by the definition of ramp loss with
0 ≤ f(z) ≤ 1. By Lemma C.2, λ+f,Pn ≤ C4. Now we proceed to upper bound the
covering number for F . For any f and f ′,
||f − f ′||∞
= supz |f(z)− f ′(z)|
= supz |lγ(−M(HA(x), y)) − lγ(−M(HA′(x), y))|
≤ supx
2
γ
||HA(x)−HA′(x)||2
≤ 2
γ
∏L
i=1 ρisiB
(∑L
j=1
||Aj −A′j||σ
si
)
,
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where the last inequality applies lemmaC.3. Since for anymatrixA, we have ||A||σ ≤
||A||F . The above inequality can be written as
||f − f ′||∞ ≤ 2
γ
L∏
i=1
ρisiB

 L∑
j=1
||Aj −A′j ||F
si

 .
Define uj, aj and a¯ as
uj =
sjuaj
4
γ
∏L
i=1 ρisiB
, aj =
1
a¯
(
bj
sj
)1/2
, a¯ =
L∑
j=1
(
bj
sj
)1/2
.
So,
2
γ
L∏
i=1
ρisiB

 L∑
j=1
uj
sj

 = u
2
.
Then, the covering numberN (F , || · ||∞, u/2) can be bounded by∫ ∞
0
√
logN (F , || · ||∞, u/2)du
≤
∫ ∞
0
√√√√ L∑
i=1
logN (Ai, || · ||F , ui)du
=
∫ ∞
0
√√√√ L∑
i=1
logN ({Ai : ||Ai||σ ≤ si, ||Ai||F ≤ bi}, || · ||F , ui)du
≤
∫ ∞
0
√√√√ L∑
i=1
logN ({Ai : ||Ai||F ≤ bi}, || · ||F , ui)du
≤
∫ ∞
0
L∑
i=1
√
logN ({Ai : ||Ai||F ≤ bi}, || · ||F , ui)du
.
Since Ai ∈ Rdi×di−1 , we can regard Ai as a vector in Rm with m = di · di−1 and
|| · ||F as the standard Euclidean distance in Rm. Then the set {Ai : ||Ai||F ≤ bi}
forms a bi-ball in Rm, and the covering number for this ball could be upper bounded
by
N ({Ai : ||Ai||F ≤ bi}, || · ||F , ui) ≤
(
3bi
ui
)m
≤
(
3bi
ui
)W 2
25
for 0 < ui < bi, and N ({Ai : ||Ai||F ≤ bi}, || · ||F , ui) = 1 for ui ≥ bi. So,∫ ∞
0
√
logN (F , || · ||∞, u/2)du
≤∑Li=1
(∫ ∞
0
√
logN ({Ai : ||Ai||F ≤ bi}, || · ||F , ui)
dui ·
4
γ
∏L
i=1 ρisiB
siai
)
≤∑Li=1
(∫ bi
0
√
logN ({Ai : ||Ai||F ≤ bi}, || · ||F , ui)
dui ·
4
γ
∏L
i=1 ρisiB
siai
)
≤∑Li=1
4
γ
∏L
i=1 ρisiBW
siai
∫ bi
0
√
log
3bi
ui
dui
=
12
γ
∏L
i=1 ρisiBW
∑L
i=1
bi
siai
∫ 1
3
0
√
log
1
ui
dui
≤ 12
γ
∏L
i=1 ρisiBWa¯
2
,
where the last inequality uses
∫ 1
3
0
√
log
1
ui
dui =
1
6
(2
√
log 3+3
√
πerfc(
√
log 3)) <
1. Substituting it into Corollary 1, we obtain
RP (f,B) ≤ 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(zi) + λ
+
f,Pn
ǫB +
√
log(1/δ)
2n
+
288
γ
√
n
∏L
i=1 ρisiBW
(∑L
i=1
(
bi
si
)1/2)2
+
12
√
π√
n
ΛǫB · (2B + 1)
.
E Proof of Corollary 5
Proof of Corollary 5. In order to apply Corollary 1, we need to verify the three as-
sumptions first. Assumption 1 holds with diam(Z) = 2B. Assumption 2 follows
from the observation that f(z) = ||Tz − z||22 ≤ B2. And for Assumption 3, suppose
f(z) = ||Tz − z||22. Then,
f(z′)− f(z)
= ||Tz′ − z′||22 − ||Tz − z||22
≤ (B + ||Tz − z||2)(||Tz′ − z′||2 − ||Tz − z||2)
≤ (B + ||Tz − z||2)||T (z′ − z)− (z′ − z)||2
≤ (B + ||Tz − z||2)||T − I||σ ||z′ − z||2
= (B + ||Tz − z||2)||z′ − z||2
,
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where the first inequality uses ||Tz − z||2 ≤ B for any z ∈ Z , the second inequality
follows from the reverse triangle inequality and the last equality holds because ||T −
I||σ = 1 for any T ∈ T k. Thus Assumption 3 holds with λ+f,Pn ≤ maxi {B + ||Tzi −
zi||2}. The covering numbers of F can be calculated as follows. Observe that
||f1 − f2||∞
= supz |f1(z)− f2(z)|
= supz
∣∣||T1z − z||22 − ||T2z − z||22∣∣
≤ 2B2||T1 − T2||σ
≤ 2B2||T1 − T2||F
≤ 2B2||U1UT1 − U2UT2 ||F
≤ 2B2||U1UT1 − U1UT2 + U1UT2 − U2UT2 ||F
≤ 4B2||U1 − U2||F
,
where the second inequality uses || · ||σ ≤ || · ||F and the last inequality follows from
the fact that ||U1(UT1 − UT2 )||F = ||(U1 − U2)UT2 )||F = ||U1 − U2||F . Then, the
covering numberN (F , || · ||∞, u/2) can be bounded by∫ ∞
0
√
logN (F , || · ||∞, u/2)du
≤
∫ ∞
0
√
logN
(
T k, || · ||F , u
4B2
)
du
≤
∫ ∞
0
√
logN ({U ∈ Rm×k : ||U ||F ≤
√
k}, || · ||F , u
8B2
)du
,
where the last inequality is due to the monotonicity of covering numbers. And the
covering number for {U ∈ Rm×k : ||U ||F ≤
√
k} could be bounded in the following
way:
N
(
{U ∈ Rm×k : ||U ||F ≤
√
k}, || · ||F , u
8B2
)
≤
(
24B2
√
k
u
)mk
for
u
8B2
<
√
k, andN ({U ∈ Rm×k : ||U ||F ≤ √k}, ||·||F , u8B2 ) = 1 for u8B2 ≥
√
k.
So, ∫ ∞
0
√
logN (F , || · ||∞, u/2)du
≤
∫ 8B2√k
0
√
mk log
24B2
√
k
u
du
≤ 24B2√mk
,
where the last inequality uses
∫ 1
3
0
√
log
1
u
du < 1. Substituting it into Corollary 1,
we obtain the desired result
RP (f,B) ≤ 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(zi) + λ
+
f,Pn
ǫB +
576B2k
√
m√
n
+
24B
√
π√
n
ΛǫB +B
2
√
log(1/δ)
2n
.
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